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Economic Hangover
Recovery Is Likely To Be Prolonged, Painful
By Bill EmmonsT
he global financial crisis and the Great Recession 
of 2008-09 marked the end of a decade that 
seemed too good to be true for many Americans.  
After escaping the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 relatively unscathed, the 
U.S. economy experienced historic booms in stock markets, housing markets 
and credit markets.  Huge increases in households’ wealth and borrowing, in 
turn, supported robust consumer-spending growth and housing investment  
despite moderate growth of income for most.  To be sure, many Americans were 
excluded from the good times, but many broad-based measures of economic 
welfare—such as the unemployment rate, consumer-spending growth, access  
to credit and the homeownership rate—rivaled or attained their best levels ever.
This “dream world” of rising wealth and material well-being became a night-
mare in 2008.  The value of stocks, nonfederal bonds and houses plunged; credit 
became unavailable to many, while mortgage foreclosures soared; and the global 
economy sank into a deep recession.  Meanwhile, most of an enormous increase 
in household debt accumulated during the free-spending decade remained in 
place, and government borrowing exploded.
Were the recent financial crisis and the ensuing severe recession merely  
“bad luck” that we might have avoided if we had, for example, cracked down  
on subprime mortgage lending much earlier?  Or was the bursting of stock-
market, housing and credit bubbles inevitable, sooner or later?  The answers to 
these questions are important for gauging the future of the U.S. economy.  If we 
simply were sidetracked by the financial crisis and recession, then we can expect 
eventually to resume many of the trends and features of the pre-2007 economy.  
If, on the other hand, the 1998-2007 decade itself was an anomaly, the crisis 
may, in fact, signal a necessary transition—albeit a painful one—to a less free-
spending but more sustainable trajectory for the U.S. economy.
This article is divided into two main parts.  The first takes a look back at the 
decade preceding the financial crisis to understand why the downturn was so 
severe.  In retrospect, it appears that some sort of  “course correction” was inevi-
table.  The U.S. economy had become dangerously dependent on consumer bor-
rowing and spending, which, in turn, depended to a large degree on rapidly rising 
house prices.  At the same time, many other countries had developed their own 
dependence on exporting to the United States.  To keep export growth high, 
these nations increasingly relied on a type of vendor financing—that is, they lent 
us the money to buy their exports.  The financial crisis marked the end of this 
uneasy equilibrium.  When house prices stopped rising, millions of American 
households no longer could support the debt they had taken on that allowed 
them to spend more than their incomes on housing, services and durable goods—
a large portion of which came from overseas.  The second part of the article 
looks forward.  While it’s always difficult to forecast the future, three possible 
scenarios for the economy are examined.  Nothing about the future economy is 
certain, but we are likely to face a prolonged and painful period of adjustment.
Part I: The Past
A Decade of Credit-Fueled Growth  
in Household Spending 
U.S. household spending grew consider-
ably faster during the 1997-2007 decade 
than personal income.  Figure 1 shows that 
per-person expenditures on goods and 
services grew about 29 percent in inflation-
adjusted terms between 1997 and 2007, 
while per-person after-tax income grew 
only about 25 percent.  Per-person inflation-
adjusted gross domestic product (GDP) 
grew only about 22 percent.
1
The result of spending growth exceed-
ing income growth is a falling saving rate, 
whether for an individual family or for the 
nation as a whole.  Figure 2 shows that the 
U.S. household saving rate fell from about  
5 percent during 1997-98 (already a histori-
cally low level) to about 2 percent during 
Part II: The Future
The Uncertain Outlook
Given the large role of household spend-
ing on goods, services and housing in the 
American and, indeed, the global economy 
during recent years, newly frugal consum-
ers are likely to keep economic growth rates 
subdued for some time.  In view of Ameri-
can households’ historically high debt bur-
den and the potential for negative feedback 
effects on income growth itself, a protracted, 
years-long period of painful adjustment 
appears likely.
Is there any escape from this scenario 
of growth-inhibiting household deleverag-
ing?  Perhaps, but it will require significant 
changes in consumer behavior and national 
economic policies.  In broad outline, Amer-
ican consumers must durably raise their 
saving rates and the federal government 
must come much closer to balancing its 
budget on a consistent basis even in the face 
of looming deficits of unprecedented size.  
Other countries must stimulate domestic 
spending and reduce their large trade sur-
pluses, which result in large capital exports 
to the United States and other countries.
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2005-07.  The figure also shows that the U.S. 
household borrowing rate—defined as the 
annual increase in the amount of household 
debt outstanding as a percent of disposable 
income—was very high during the decade.
The period 1997-2007, thus, was a decade 
of rising household debt.  Figure 3 shows the 
increase in household indebtedness after 
1997 relative to the increase in household 
income.  Inflation-adjusted per-person   
debt increased more than 80 percent 
between 1997 and 2007, the largest increase 
over a 10-year span since the 1960s.  The 
lion’s share of household borrowing during 
the decade was secured against owner-
occupied housing—that is, in the form of 
mortgage debt.  The amount of inflation-
adjusted mortgage debt outstanding per 
person nearly doubled between 1997 
and 2007, while the value of household 
real estate grew a bit less than 90 percent 
through 2007.
Aggressive mortgage borrowing might 
have seemed like a good idea as long as 
housing and other asset values were rising.  
Now that housing values have declined 
sharply in many parts of the country, the 
inherent risk of leverage has been exposed.  
Debt magnifies both the gains and losses  
on the asset being financed.  The 65 percent 
of U.S. home-owning households that  
have any mortgage debt together appear  
to have lost virtually all of their homeown-
ers’ equity between early 2006 and early 
2009, almost $6 trillion (Figure 4).  Com-
pounded by rising unemployment, the loss 
of homeowners’ equity has been a major 
factor driving mortgage-foreclosure rates  
to historic highs.
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A Growing but Unbalanced 
U.S. Economy
Although overall U.S. economic growth 
during the decade through 2007 averaged 
about 3 percent annually, just as it had dur-
ing the previous 10 years, the composition 
and financing of U.S. growth were quite dif-
ferent across the two decades.  The economy 
after 1997 became dominated by consumer 
and government spending at the expense 
of business investment and exports, while 
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the domestic investment that took place 
was skewed toward residential building and 
increasingly relied on funds provided by 
foreign investors in the U.S.
The Composition of U.S. GDP Growth
While consumer spending accounted 
for about 65 percent of economic growth 
during the 1988-1997 decade, it consti-
tuted 82.5 percent of growth during the 
1998-2007 decade (Table 1).  Government 
spending on goods and services contributed 
a further 14 percent to economic growth 
during the later decade, compared with 
only 7 percent during the earlier decade.  
Thus, consumer and government spending 
together accounted for 72 percent of GDP 
growth during the 1988-97 decade, but  
96 percent during the 1998-2007 decade.
Compared with the longer U.S. post-
World War II history, the composition of 
GDP growth during 1998-2007 also was 
unusual.  Consumer and government 
spending together constituted about 81 
percent of GDP growth during the 1950-87 
period, while business investment and  
net exports together accounted for about  
11 percent.  The corresponding figures of  
96 and 3 percent, respectively, for the 1998-
2007 period betray a significant shift  
toward consumer and government spend-
ing at the expense of business investment 
and net exports.
The Financing of U.S. Investment
Another way to look at the economy is 
to see how its investment is financed.  Any 
nation has two sources of funds for invest-
ment—domestic saving and borrowing 
from abroad.  Because the household sector 
is such a large part of the U.S. economy, it 
should come as no surprise that the declining 
household saving rate during the 1997-2007  
decade was echoed by a shift toward foreign 
borrowing by the nation as a whole.  As 
shown in Table 1, the U.S. trade deficit 
increased sharply after 1997.  This implies, as 
a matter of accounting, that the U.S. greatly 
increased its borrowing from foreigners.   
U.S. net borrowing from abroad exceeded  
4 percent of GDP each year from 2000 
through 2008 (with the exception of 2001, at 
3.9 percent), a level not previously exceeded 
since the early part of the 20th century. 
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Mortgage Debt and Homeowners’ Equity
  NOTE: Data are annual through 2009. 
SOURCES: Federal Reserve Board and Bureau of Economic Analysis
NOTE: Data are quarterly through Q4.2009. 
SOURCES: Federal Reserve Board and author’s estimates.
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Is Unbalanced Growth Better  
than No Growth at All?
While the trends just described were 
visible at the time, many commentators 
dismissed them as harmless or, indeed, 
beneficial aspects of an increasingly global-
ized world economy.  Their argument was 
seductively simple:  Just as individuals and 
nations specialize in activities they do best 
and trade with others to increase the welfare 
of all, perhaps the globalization of goods, 
services and capital markets would allow the 
United States to concentrate on what it did 
best and then trade with others that special-
ized differently.
The obvious flaw in this argument is that 
what the U.S. appeared to do best on a large 
scale—consumer spending, homebuilding, 
borrowing and the provision of sophisti-
cated financial services, such as mortgage 
securitization—did not result in a stable,  
let alone balanced, international trade posi-
tion or a stable saving rate.  In fact, the U.S.  
trade deficit—more precisely, the current-
account deficit—doubled as a percent of 
GDP between 1997 and 1999, then nearly 
doubled again by 2006.  Had this trend 
continued, financing our burgeoning trade 
deficit would have become increasingly  
difficult.  At the same time, the household  
(and national) saving rate was falling per-
sistently—which it could not do forever.  It 
now appears that, by 1997 or 1998 at the 
latest, the U.S. economy had embarked on a 
path of unbalanced growth.  Sooner or later, 
a major course correction was inevitable.
As it turned out, some of the rebalancing 
had begun before the financial crisis and 
recession hit.  In particular, house prices 
stopped rising in about 2006.  Increasing  
numbers of households defaulted on their  
unsupportable debts, a fate merely postponed 
by rising house prices during the preceding 
years.  As mortgage defaults and market-
value losses on mortgage-backed securities 
rippled through the financial system, the 
economy itself began to slow sharply.  The 
severe financial and economic shocks of 
2008 and 2009 were the ultimate result and 
have accelerated the reversal of the trends in 
place for a decade.
Global Imbalances—Part of the  
Solution or the Problem?
Just as the U.S. economy evolved in an 
unbalanced and historically unusual way 
after the Asian crisis of 1997-98, unusual 
international developments were taking 
place.  Average rates of U.S. and world 
economic growth were healthy during the 
1997-2007 decade, but individual econo-
mies diverged markedly in how they grew.  
Consumer spending, housing investment 
and government spending took on increas-
ing importance in the United States and in 
some other high-income countries like the 
United Kingdom, while business investment 
and exports lagged.  At the same time, many 
other countries—including both high-
income and developing countries—were 
virtual mirror images of the U.S., increas-
ing business investment and exports faster 
than consumer or government spending.  
The U.S. personal and national saving rates 
declined to historic lows, while these “mir-
ror-image” countries experienced sharply 
higher saving rates.
To secure a more even pattern of invest-
ment around the world, the countries with a 
surplus of savings together lent hundreds of 
billions of dollars each year to the countries 
generating insufficient domestic savings to 
fund desired investment.  By accounting  
necessity, these growing international 
co m p o sItIo n   o f  u.s.  gDp gr o w t h
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real gDp growth 
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ment (I; % of 
gDp growth)
contribution of 
net exports (nX; 
% of gDp growth
sum of con-
tributions of  
I and nX (% of 
gDp growth)
1950-1987 3.72 63.4 18.8 81.2 13.0 –2.1 10.9
1988-1997 3.05 64.9 7.4 72.3 20.1 3.3 23.4
1998-2007 3.02 82.5 13.9 96.4 18.1 –15.5 2.6
source:  bureau of economic analysis
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capital flows were associated with offset- 
ting imbalances in the trade accounts of  
the respective countries.
Countries in the first group incurred 
increasing deficits on their international 
current accounts, while countries in the 
second group accumulated large surpluses.  
The deficit countries—including the U.S., 
the U.K., Spain and a few others—had in 
common relatively sophisticated finan-
cial systems and relaxed attitudes toward 
borrowing.  Surplus countries—including 
China, a number of other emerging-market 
countries, Japan, Germany and several 
oil-exporting countries—typically had 
less well-developed financial sectors and 
a less borrower-friendly climate.  Some 
surplus countries also appeared to follow 
an “export-led growth strategy,” defined 
by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) to include an undervalued exchange 
rate together with measures to compress 
domestic spending.
3  The result of these 
policies was to increase the country’s trade 
surplus and, at the same time, increase its 
financial-account deficit (lending abroad).  
The emergence of large global imbalances 
during the decade after the Asian crisis has 
been studied in great detail, while their 
interpretation remains open to debate.
4
The IMF and other analysts have out-
lined a number of scenarios for the world 
economy during the next few years.
5  The 
possibilities range from very good—an 
internationally coordinated restructuring 
of key economies—to very bad—a retreat 
into short-sighted, protectionist policies 
leading to a renewed global economic 
slump.  Which outcome ultimately occurs 
depends on how private and public actors 
behave during the next few, critical months 
and years.  Here are three broad scenarios, 
together with the policy actions that would 
make them possible.
Scenario 1:  Global Cooperation To  
Rebalance World Output and Demand
The most optimistic scenario entails 
wide-spread, simultaneous efforts by the 
leaders and ordinary citizens of many 
countries to refocus their economies on 
sustainable domestic production and con-
sumption.  In this context, sustainability 
refers to patterns of work, investment and 
spending that do not rely on persistent, large 
international transfers of economic and 
financial resources.  Drawing an analogy to 
an individual household, the basic idea is 
that “profligate” consumers should plan to 
spend within their means without frequent 
recourse to borrowing, while “miserly” 
households should avoid accumulating 
excessive savings that are lent to others.  At 
the national level, it implies that interna-
tional trade and financial balances should 
not be far from zero in either direction over 
long periods of time.
Unfortunately, the U.S. has incurred very 
large trade deficits and corresponding finan-
cial surpluses (capital imports) for decades.  
Moreover, the imbalances grew sharply 
during the 1997-2007 decade.  This pattern 
of increasingly unsustainable economic 
growth was an important contributor to the 
global economic and financial crisis that 
occurred because, ultimately, millions of 
American households buckled under exces-
sive burdens of unsupported debt when 
house prices declined.
At the same time that many American 
households were digging themselves deeper 
into debt, there were offsetting imbalances 
building up in other countries.  Given the 
interdependent nature of international trade 
and capital flows, it clearly would be best if 
coordinated behavior and policy changes 
could be undertaken in many or all of the 
affected countries. 
A benign global rebalancing would see 
deficit countries, such as the United States, 
increase saving by households and the fed-
eral government, while increasing business 
investment and exports.  At the same time, 
surplus countries such as China would expand 
social safety nets (to decrease households’ 
need to save), improve corporate governance 
(to decrease hoarding of cash and wasteful 
overinvestment), and encourage consumer 
spending and imports.  Other groups of sur-
plus countries also could contribute mean-
ingfully to global rebalancing.  For example, 
oil-exporting countries could delink oil 
prices from the dollar, and the aging econo-
mies of Europe and Japan could take actions 
to raise their domestic growth potential.
6
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the possibilities range from 
very good—an internationally 
coordinated restructuring 
of key economies—to very 
bad—a retreat into short-
sighted, protectionist policies 
leading to a renewed global 
economic slump.The Regional Economist  |  www.stlouisfed.org   9
deficits and near-zero short-term interest  
rates—which probably kept the global 
economy out of a depression—are reversed 
abruptly and if private-sector spending 
slows unexpectedly, economies around the 
world could fall back into a slump as bad as 
or worse than the downturn experienced 
during 2008 and 2009.  Under these circum-
stances of a “double-dip” global recession, 
renewed policy interventions might need to 
be even more drastic than during the first 
downturn.  Further long-lasting economic 
damage in the form of long-term unemploy-
ment and financial defaults would occur.
Conclusion
Paying the Piper
With the benefit of hindsight, one can 
say we should have seen the financial crisis 
coming.  Although some analysts pointed 
to unbalanced U.S. economic growth and 
growing global financial imbalances, few 
anticipated how rapid, severe and global the 
downturn would turn out to be.
Americans almost certainly will save 
more, spend in closer proportion to their 
income and increase their borrowing more 
slowly, or decrease it outright in the coming  
years.  Said differently, a protracted period 
of household “deleveraging” appears likely.  
This will translate into relatively slow 
consumer spending and overall economic 
growth unless other sources of demand 
materialize.  If economic growth remains 
weak, it will mean that house prices remain 
subdued, mortgage defaults remain high 
due to frequent instances of negative home-
owners’ equity and the average American 
household’s financial situation improves 
only slowly.
One bitter lesson we have learned is that 
unbalanced growth, whether in one country 
or around the world, brings risks in its wake.   
Unless we are able to rebalance our own 
economy and, in cooperation with other 
major countries, do the same at the global 
level, we are likely to face a long period of 
slow and volatile economic recovery.  
Bill Emmons is an economist at the Federal  
Reserve Bank of St. Louis.  For more on his 
work, see http://www.stlouisfed.org/banking/
pdf/SPA/Emmons_vitae.pdf
This benign-rebalancing scenario probably 
would be associated with weaker currency 
values in deficit countries and stronger 
currencies in surplus countries.  Orderly 
exchange-rate changes can moderate the 
domestic adjustments needed in wages and 
prices to support changing trade patterns.
Scenario 2:  Lack of Coordinated Policy 
Adjustments—Global Imbalances Return
Less-benign outcomes are possible, of 
course.  Continued reliance on export-led  
growth strategies in major emerging mar-
kets and some large, advanced countries 
could frustrate attempts by the U.S. to shift 
its economy away from excessive consumer 
and government borrowing and spending  
and toward business investment and exports.   
Conversely, our trading partners could take 
positive steps that our own indifference or 
policy gridlock negated.
Suppose the U.S. unilaterally made a 
number of politically difficult policy choices 
that would support economic restructur-
ing and global rebalancing.  These might 
include reducing tax incentives that favor 
excessive housing investment, mortgage 
borrowing and health-care expenditures, 
as well as implementing a broad-based 
consumption tax designed to encourage 
saving over consumer spending.  But if our 
trading partners did not simultaneously 
increase their willingness and ability to buy 
our exports, the result could be disastrous.  
A very weak U.S. economy could be crippled 
by an even more depressed housing market 
and a shrinking health-care sector, while 
export sectors showed negligible improve-
ment over their growth baselines.  The 
political response likely would be to reverse 
the reforms and expand bailout efforts.  A 
return to low household and national sav-
ing, unbalanced domestic growth and global 
imbalances probably would follow.
Scenario 3:  No Policy Adjustments and 
Premature Withdrawal of Macroeconomic 
Support—Global Slump Returns
A third possibility is that no progress 
toward economic restructuring of any kind 
is made, while policymakers in the United 
States and elsewhere misjudge the strength 
of economic recovery.  If government 
policies that have resulted in large budget 
E N DNO T E S
1   Data from Bureau of Economic Analysis.  An 
important reason why household after-tax  
income grew faster than GDP was that tax 
rates were reduced in the early 2000s.  Thus, 
part of the growth in disposable household 
income during the decade represented a  
redistribution of national income, rather  
than genuine increases in output.
2   See Emmons.  The aggregate value of home-
owners’ equity conceals a wide variety of 
individual situations.  Many homeowners 
with mortgage debt have positive equity, while 
many others have negative equity.  It is those 
with negative equity who are at greatest risk  
of default.
3   See Blanchard and Milesi-Ferretti.
4   See Bernanke and Blanchard and 
Milesi-Ferretti.
5   See Blanchard and Milesi-Ferretti.
6   Delinking oil prices from the dollar might 
divert some capital exports from oil export-
ing-nations into non-U.S. markets, resulting 
in less upward pressure on the dollar.  Mean-
while, deregulating labor markets and service 
sectors in the aging nations of Europe and 
Japan could raise domestic growth potential 
and reduce trade surpluses.
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